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The Voluntary Principle and Church Autonomy,
Then and Now
Thomas C. Berg ∗
I. THE FOUNDING ERA CHURCH-STATE SETTLEMENT
AND THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE
Professor Carl Esbeck’s paper,1 which offers a historical
perspective on the issue of church autonomy, will serve as a terrific
resource for future work by legal scholars. Professor Esbeck
introduces into the legal literature a discussion of how church-state
relations developed in the forty years after the ratification of the First
Amendment. He surveys the writing on that period by leading
observers and scholars of American religion, such as Robert Baird,
Sidney Mead, Philip Schaff, William Warren Sweet, and Alexis de
Tocqueville.2 One can argue that, with respect to religious freedom,
our nation’s “founding era” really extends to encompass these later
decades, concluding with the demise of the last state regime of tax
assessments for religious teaching, that of Massachusetts, in 1833.3

∗ Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota), and CoDirector, Terence J. Murphy Institute for Catholic Thought, Law, and Public Policy. Thanks
to Fred Gedicks and Deborah Wright for their hospitality at the Conference on Church
Autonomy at Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School, February 6–7, 2004, at
which I gave the remarks on which this paper is based. Thanks to the participants in the
conference, especially Kathleen Brady, for illuminating comments and discussion of various
points.
1. Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in the
Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385.
2. Id. at 1547–70; see also, e.g., ROBERT BAIRD, RELIGION IN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (Edwin S. Gaustad ed., Arno Press & The New York Times 1969) (1844); SIDNEY
E. MEAD, THE LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANITY IN AMERICA (1976);
PHILIP SCHAFF, AMERICA: A SKETCH OF ITS POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND RELIGIOUS
CHARACTER (Perry Miller ed., 1961) (1855); WILLIAM WARREN SWEET, REVIVALISM IN
AMERICA: ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND DECLINE (1944); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J. P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds., Harper & Row 1966) (1851).
3. For other historical works connecting these periods, see, for example, EDWIN
GAUSTAD, FAITH OF OUR FATHERS: RELIGION AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1776–1826
(1987); WILLIAM MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT 1630–1833 (1971).
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Professor Esbeck primarily describes the church-state
“settlement” of the founding era and the early republic. The nature
of that settlement combined basic religious freedom for all faiths
(free exercise) with government noninvolvement in the distinctive
sphere of religious life and in the churches (nonestablishment). The
specific features of the settlement included:
(1) A separation of church and state that emphasized the
exclusion of the state from “inherently religious” activities and that
was designed primarily to protect the vitality and independence of
religious groups.4 This separation stood in marked contrast to a
separationism founded on a suspicion of religion and a desire to
protect society from religious oppression—a prime example of which
is the laicité principle arising out of the French Revolution.5
(2) Equal governmental treatment of all faiths—in part to avoid
divisions that had arisen when colonial or state governments favored
one faith.6
(3) A reaffirmation that religious principles and voices were
crucial to the health of society and therefore were welcome in
politics and public debate. Those religious principles, however, were
to be nurtured in voluntary associations independent of the state.7
This founding-era settlement, Professor Esbeck notes, is well
summarized in the “voluntary principle” described in the 1840s by
Presbyterian historian Robert Baird. As Baird painted the picture,
government would neither suppress nor promote worship:
In every state liberty of conscience and liberty of worship is
complete. The government extends protection to all. . . . The
proper civil authorities have nothing to do with the creed of those
who open a place of worship.
....
On the other hand, . . . neither the general government nor that
of the States does any thing directly for the maintenance of public
worship.

4. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 1393–94, 1590–91.
5. For a thorough discussion of French laicité and American religious freedom, critical
of some of the applications of both, see T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicité: A
Comparison of the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419.
6. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 1394, 1396, 1569.
7. Id. at 1398–1400.
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. . . [Religion relies] upon the efforts of its friends, acting from
their own free will.8

Professor Esbeck’s focus on this widespread historical consensus
is salutary for our current debates about church autonomy and other
church-state issues. Taking a historical consensus as a starting point
helps us—and. more importantly, judges interpreting the
Constitution—to choose among the wide array of possible
approaches to church-state relations. When judges are disciplined by
history, they cannot simply enunciate whatever approach to church
and state they like and baptize it with the broad language of the First
Amendment. Moreover, history affects our present situation.
America may be a nation of frontiersmen and immigrants, but even
here individuals and societies do not entirely reinvent themselves. If
the voluntarist approach was the dominant principle of church-state
relations adopted in our founding era, it deserves at least serious
consideration as an approach today as well.
However, the lessons of history can also be complicated, and that
is the issue I wish to explore in this commentary. Professor Esbeck
aims to identify the widespread consensus about religion and
government in early America. Consistent with this emphasis on
consensus, he discusses two issues of current law whose proper
resolution is unambiguous under the voluntary principle. First,
Professor Esbeck argues that religious perspectives should be
welcome in political debate and activity on the same terms as other
perspectives.9 Second, and related, he writes that religious speech
and activity should be welcome in public schools on the same terms
as their secular counterparts, as the Court has repeatedly held.10
But in setting forth this consensus, Professor Esbeck does not
focus on issues that, as to the voluntary principle of antebellum
America, were ambiguous or contained internal tensions. Where
such ambiguities exist, the application of the founding-era settlement
to these issues in modern times could be expected to produce hard
8. BAIRD, supra note 2, at 287−88; see also Esbeck, supra note 1, at 259−62
(summarizing Baird’s description).
9. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 1397 n. 30.
10. Id. at 1585–86; see also, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98
(2001); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Capitol
Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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cases. And indeed it has. The three areas on which the precise
contours of the voluntary principle were open to question were, as I
will try to show: (1) government financial aid to the human services
provided by religious organizations, such as education and social
work; (2) government promotion of general religious ideas through
nonfinancial, noncoercive means, such as prayers in public schools;
and (3) constitutional protection of the private religious conduct of
churches or individual believers against restrictions by general laws
not aimed at religion.11 Not surprisingly, these are the areas of
church-state interaction that remain hotly disputed and regularly
litigated.
In these comments, I look first at the history, proceeding from
Professor Esbeck’s solid foundation, to explore how the voluntary
principle contained ambiguities with respect to each of these three
areas. Next I look at translating that history into the present: I
explore how circumstances have changed since the early republic and
how those changes might affect the application of the voluntary
principle to today’s hard cases. I conclude that the changes have
strengthened the case for forbidding government’s own expression
of its preferred religious view, but that they have also strengthened
the case for exempting some private religious conduct from generally
applicable laws and for permitting religious organizations to receive
some kinds of government financial aid. In keeping with the theme
of the conference, I concentrate on how the founding-era settlement
might apply particularly to the autonomy of churches and other
religious organizations.

11. As Professor Esbeck puts it, “practice [in the 1800s] lagged behind principle”
concerning the voluntarist settlement; “Americans did not always foresee the full ramifications
when lofty principle was later worked out at the retail level.” Esbeck, supra note 1, at 1400.
This was particularly true with respect to “the state’s verbal and symbolic endorsement” of
Christianity in forms other than “funding support”—such as school prayers, legislative prayers,
civic pledges, thanksgiving proclamations, and so forth. Id. at 1400 n.39. I discuss these
practices infra in Part II.A.
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II. THE VOLUNTARY PRINCIPLE AND CHURCH
AUTONOMY, THEN AND NOW

A. Government Noncoercive Religious Statements and Ceremonies
The first issue on which the founding-era settlement contained
ambiguities or internal tensions is the government’s sponsorship of
religious exercises, ceremonies, or teachings, such as legislative
prayers, Thanksgiving Day proclamations, and prayers or Bible
readings in public schools. Such official religious affirmations were
pervasive in nineteenth-century America. Here and later, I quote
Robert Baird, who, as Professor Esbeck notes, was virtually
unequaled in his “comprehensive understanding of ‘the whole range
of religious activity in the [antebellum] United States.’”12
Notwithstanding the principle that religious activity should be
voluntary and all faiths equal, Baird noted that legislation in the
states “is still decidedly favourable, in general, to the interests of
Christianity.”13 Although the states “relinquish[ed] all attempts to
promote religion by what is called an establishment, yet they . . .
deemed it neither unwise nor unjust to pursue the same end
indirectly.”14 Baird cited as examples Sunday-closing laws,
antiblasphemy laws, theistic oaths in court, and officially sponsored
Bible readings in “most” of the (then very new) state-sponsored
schools.15
Such indirect practices seemed to be approved by the churchstate settlement: government noninvolvement in the province of the
church did not mean total government separation from general
religious ideas and affirmations relevant to civic life. As Professor
Esbeck puts it, many Americans “rationalized” such nonfinancial
support of religion “as not inconsistent with the American
church/state settlement” in large part because it “was not coercive
but only ceremonial; no one had to believe it,” though the
government would teach it.16 Yet as Professor Esbeck also suggests,
12. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 1552 (quoting ROBERT BAIRD, RELIGION IN AMERICA: A
CRITICAL ABRIDGEMENT xiii (Henry Warden Bowen ed., 1970) (1856)).
13. BAIRD, supra note 2, at 273.
14. Id. at 277.
15. Id. at 274, 279; see also id. at 279 (adding that “[w]here [primary-school teachers]
are pious, they find no difficulty in giving a great deal of religious instruction”).
16. Esbeck, supra note 1, at 1400–01 n.39.
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such practices also seemed to contravene several aspects of the
voluntary principle.17 They did constitute government involvement
in religious matters; religion was not left wholly to private initiative.
These practices could sap the vitality of religious ideas by corrupting
them to serve government’s ends rather than divine mandates. And
the practices did, in at least an indirect sense, treat as less equal those
who did not share the generalized Christian faith reflected in them.
In the late twentieth century, of course, the Supreme Court
began to strike down such practices—beginning with statecomposed prayers in the public schools—as violations of the
Establishment Clause, incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment.18 These decisions can be justified in part on the basis of
the autonomy of churches and religious life: the autonomy that, as
Professor Esbeck shows, was central to the American church-state
settlement. The original school prayer ruling stated that “a union of
government and religion tends to [among other things] degrade
religion.”19 And as I have argued elsewhere, practices like school
prayer lost the support of many elites in the 1960s precisely because
of a sense that such practices had made mainstream American
Christianity self-satisfied—had led it to ignore pervasive injustices
such as racial segregation—because of “the illusion that America was
a ‘Christian nation.’”20
Some prominent mainline Protestants, for example, argued that
public religious ceremonies were “often in content little more than
the national culture religion,”21 encouraging a “national selfrighteousness” and an “emphasis on social conformity.”22 They
17. Id. at 1400 (referring to “the state’s verbal and symbolic endorsement” as a case in
which “practice lagged behind principle”).
18. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (majority-ratified
official prayers at high school football games); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (statesponsored prayer by clergyman at school graduation); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989) (crèche erected in government building); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980), reh’g denied, 449 U.S. 1104 (1981) (posting of Ten Commandments in schools);
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (school-sponsored Bible readings);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state-composed official school prayers).
19. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431.
20. Thomas C. Berg, Race Relations and Modern Church-State Relations, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 1009, 1014–16 (2002) (citing various sources).
21. Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments (Aug. 8, 1966)
(statement of Robert S. Alley), reprinted in ROBERT S. ALLEY, SCHOOL PRAYER: THE COURT,
THE CONGRESS, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 247, 250 (1994).
22. JOHN C. BENNETT, CHRISTIANS AND THE STATE 7 (1958).
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charged that official prayers were “more akin to a national cult than
to the faith of the New Testament” and that pervasive racial injustice
revealed “the shallowness of the public religious sentiments of the
era.”23 They argued that eliminating official religious ceremonies
would “dissipat[e] the myth that ours is a Christian country” and
would deliver the Christian church from a posture of privilege into a
posture of seeking justice and freedom for all people.24 These
sentiments reflect an application in the 1960s of the voluntarist
warning that close government-religious interaction—even when
meant to help religion—can threaten the independent, prophetic
role of religious organizations and communities.
But in all likelihood, the primary rationale for the school prayer
decisions was a concern that such practices relegated religious
dissenters to an unequal position. In the decisions of the 1960s, the
Court extended this concern beyond minority or dissenting Christian
denominations to protect non-Christians and those with no religious
faith at all. The 1961 decision striking down requirements that
officeholders declare belief in God, for example, emphasized that the
state may not “aid all religions as against nonbelievers, [or] those
religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those
religions founded on different beliefs.”25 This extension of Religion
Clause limitations no doubt reflected the nation’s increasing
pluralism in matters of religion. As that pluralism has increased, any
official religious exercise by government—no matter how general its
terms—has come more and more to seem partial, to exclude a
significant number of views on religious questions.
To put it another way, the increase in religious pluralism is one
of the developments since the early republic that has affected how
the voluntary principle should apply today. As I have tried briefly to
show, the voluntary principle as adopted in the early republic
contained ambiguities and internal tensions on the question of
government-sponsored religious ceremonies. Such practices were

23. ALLEY, supra note 21, at 250.
24. Id. at 122 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting a 1962 statement by Rev.
Gerald Burrill, Episcopal Bishop of Chicago); see also COLIN W. WILLIAMS, WHAT IN THE
WORLD? 64 (1964).
25. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 430 (1962) (“[T]he fact that the [state-composed official school] prayer may be
denominationally neutral [cannot] . . . serve to free it from the limitations of the Establishment
Clause . . . .”).
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widely accepted, but they conflicted in principle with many of the
underlying goals of the voluntary approach. It is not surprising,
therefore, that modern decisions have pushed the voluntarist
approach toward greater disapproval of government-sponsored
religious ceremonies. Because of later developments, internal
tensions in the church-state settlement on this topic have been
resolved in favor of striking down more and more of these
practices.26
B. Government Aid to Religious Organizations
A second key church-state question, in the early 1800s and
today, is whether government may provide tax-supported assistance
for valuable services—such as education and social services—that are
rendered by religious organizations.
On this score, again, the antebellum church-state settlement
contained some internal tensions. At its core, the voluntary principle
(as described by Baird) includes some strong statements against
government support for religious activity by private organizations. As
I noted earlier, the voluntary principle meant that no level of
government “does any thing directly for the maintenance of public
worship[;] . . . no where does the civil power defray the expenses of
the churches, or pay the salaries of ministers of the gospel, excepting
in the case of a few chaplains connected with the public service.”27 As
a result, Baird said, religion in America had to rely, “under God,
upon the efforts of its friends, acting from their own free will.”28 The
advantage of this was that Americans had “been trained to exercise
the same energy, self-reliance, and enterprise in the cause of religion

26. The argument here is not that later developments can justify striking down a
practice that was clearly consistent with the original meaning of the Religion Clauses or the
founding-era settlement. The argument is that where the original settlement contained
ambiguities, later developments can help determine how to resolve the ambiguities in applying
the settlement today.
The current case law, of course, also reflects ambivalence and tension about the
permissibility of government-sponsored religion. See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004) (avoiding question of whether “under God” in school
recitations of the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
(1984) (permitting a crèche in a city-sponsored Christmas display); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983) (permitting official legislative prayers and chaplaincies).
27. BAIRD, supra note 2, at 288.
28. Id. (describing this as “the grand and only alternative” in America).
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which they exhibit in other affairs.”29 For example, if a church
building were damaged or destroyed, “instead of looking to some
government official for the means of needful repair, a few of [the
congregation] put their hands into their pockets, and suppl[ied]
these themselves, without delay or the risk of vexatious refusals from
public functionaries.”30 These passages quickly but forcefully make
the case—still highly relevant today—that government support for a
religious entity’s activities can rob the entity of its independence and
vitality. Government assistance may be “delay[ed],” may come with
“vexatious” strings attached, and may undermine a religious
community’s “energy, self-reliance, and enterprise.”31
Remember, however, that Baird simultaneously emphasized the
many “indirect” ways in which government could support
Christianity or religion in general—ways that extended to taxfinanced support for religious education and social services.32 For
example, governments in the antebellum period commonly assisted
religiously inspired education, “though in doing so, they often
assist[ed] the cause of religion, in what might be considered almost
the most direct manner possible.”33 States gave aid to “colleges
directed by religious men, . . . while well aware that the colleges
aided by such grants [were] under a decided religious influence;”
states gave aid “without stipulating for the slightest control over
these institutions.”34 The states also aided many preparatory
academies—schools for teenage males preparing for college—of
which many were “conducted by ministers of the gospel and other
religious men” and therefore were “nurseries of vast importance
both for the church and the state.”35 As to state-supported primary
schools, Baird first made the relatively modest claim that their simple
dissemination of knowledge, “although not religion, greatly
facilitates [religion’s] diffusion by means of books.”36 But he
added—and other sources confirm—that the Bible was “read in most
of the schools,” and that “[w]here [primary-school teachers were]
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 292.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
BAIRD, supra note 2, at 277.
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id.
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pious, they [found] no difficulty in giving a great deal of religious
instruction.”37
State governments also provided liberal amounts of aid to socialwelfare entities such as “asylums for the deaf and dumb, and for the
blind, almost all of which institutions [were] under a decidedly
religious influence.”38 And states with large cities also gave support
to religiously inspired “retreats or houses of refuge, where young
offenders . . . who have not gone hopelessly astray, may be placed for
reformation.”39 The precedent for today’s charitable-choice and
“faith-based” initiatives is unmistakable.
If we again take Baird’s description as accurate, the church-state
settlement of the early republic seemingly drew a distinction between
government: (a) supporting distinctively religious elements such as
clergy, worship, and church buildings; and (b) supporting activities
such as education and social services that were provided by religious
organizations and contained religious elements. The latter activities
offer a social benefit whether they are provided by religious or
nonreligious organizations. Thus, one can argue that an entity
providing the services should not be disqualified from state assistance
simply because it is religiously affiliated or incorporates religious
teachings into the activity. Such an idea has echoes in modern case
law and legislation. The Court has held that states may include
religious elementary and secondary schools in educational voucher
programs40 but has also left the states free to deny generally available
scholarships to students engaged in ministerial training, which the
Court called a “distinct category of instruction” from other
subjects.41 Likewise, recent charitable-choice programs offer aid to
religious social-service providers on the same terms as their secular
counterparts, but the aid may not go directly to distinctively
religious activities such as “sectarian worship, instruction, or
proselytization.”42
37. Id. at 279; see also ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN
UNITED STATES 371–72 (rev. one-vol. ed. 1964) (noting “the common practice [in the
1830s] of reading the King James Version of the Bible at the opening exercises in public
schools”).
38. BAIRD, supra note 2, at 279.
39. Id.
40. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
41. Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1313 (2004).
42. See, e.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
§ 104(j), 42 U.S.C. § 604A(j) (2002).
THE
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But this line between “inherently religious” activities and
education or social services reflects, again, an internal tension in the
church-state settlement. Even aid to “inherently religious” activities
typically provides some social benefit, as does aid to education or
social services. Conversely, aid to activities such as education or social
services provided by religious entities may likewise undercut some of
the principles of voluntarism, as does aid to clergy or worship
services. When religious schools or social services receive aid, they
may become dependent on government rather than on the energy
and philanthropy of their members, and so lose their vitality. They
may also lose their independence because of conditions that
government places on its aid. Such concerns continue to play a role
in modern-day separationist arguments against government aid to
religious schools and social services.43
If the voluntary principle contains internal tensions concerning
educational or social service aid, how do modern developments affect
the application of the principle? Within a few years after Baird’s 1844
book, many Protestants began to argue that the voluntary principle
forbade state aid to the newly appearing Roman Catholic schools. By
the end of the nineteenth century, this position had become
dominant and was defended in part on the ground that it promoted
voluntarism and the separation of church and state.44 But the
opposition to parochial school aid was also tainted with simple
dislike of, and often unwarranted prejudice against, the Catholic
Church and Catholic citizens.45 Explicit theological attacks on
43. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 650 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(arguing that state inspections of religious schools receiving aid “raises more than an imagined
specter of governmental ‘secularization of a creed’”); Derek H. Davis, Mitchell v. Helms and
the Modern Cultural Assault on the Separation of Church and State, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1035,
1062 (2002) (warning that religious groups may “become nondescript members of a social
service organization class vying for governmental aid”).
44. See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 219–23
(2002); Richard W. Garnett, The Theology of the Blaine Amendments, 2 FIRST AMENDMENT L.
REV. 45 (2003).
45. For presentations of the evidence of anti-Catholicism, see, for example, Brief of the
Becket Fund for Religious Liberty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 6–15, Mitchell
v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648); HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 201–19,
246–51; LLOYD JORGENSEN, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL, 1825–1925
(1987); Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments:
Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 551 (2003); John
C. Jeffries, Jr., & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 279, 297–303 (2001); Douglas Laycock, The Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46
EMORY L.J. 43, 50–51 (1997); Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine’s Wake: School Choice, the First
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Catholicism were common in the anti-aid movement. Moreover, the
Protestant majority’s arguments for private philanthropy and churchstate separation were selective and self-serving. The aid opponents
doggedly defended Protestant-style religious exercises in stateoperated schools through most of the nineteenth century.46 And as
Baird’s description indicates, the no-aid rule seldom if ever extended
to colleges, the sector of education in which Protestants maintained
their own institutions.47 The Protestant majority’s rules against aid to
“sectarian” institutions were thoroughly self-serving.
The major development of recent decades has been the rise of
the welfare state—the extension of government financial assistance
(and regulation) into most areas of life, including education and
social services. The welfare state sets new baselines. Generally,
religious schools and social services now benefit from aid only as part
of a broader program in which aid also flows to nonreligious
counterparts: private entities, public schools, and social service
agencies.
By contrast, the voluntary principle (as Baird saw it) trained
Americans “to exercise the same energy, self-reliance, and enterprise
in the cause of religion which they exhibit in other affairs.”48 In the
early republic, the elimination of tax support for clergy and churches
put religion on the same voluntary footing as most other activities,
which likewise were not government-supported. But in today’s
different circumstances, it is at best uncertain whether the voluntary
principle is served by withholding funding for those schools or social
services that are religiously inspired or incorporate religious
messages. This is so for two related reasons.
First, equal support to religious choices, when secular choices are
supported, may actually be necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of
voluntarism: ensuring that religious activities thrive or fail on the
basis of the free choice of individuals, or as the Supreme Court has
put it, “according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its
dogma.”49 The exclusion of religious schools or social services from
Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 657, 665–75 (1998),
reviewed by Richard W. Garnett, Brown’s Promise, Blaine’s Legacy, 17 CONST. COMM. 651,
670–74 (2000).
46. Jeffries and Ryan, supra note 45, at 303.
47. See supra notes 31–32 and accompanying text.
48. BAIRD, supra note 2, at 292.
49. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
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funding programs creates a disincentive for beneficiaries to use
religious options as compared with subsidized secular options. In the
welfare state, therefore, equal funding for religiously oriented
activities often serves the goal of voluntary choice and indeed may be
crucial to it. Religion must make its own way under the voluntary
principle, but that does not mean forcing it to overcome special
barriers and disabilities. Put differently, in the welfare state,
excluding religious entities from assistance is just as much a state
intervention into voluntary religious life as is including them—
perhaps a greater intervention. The modern Court seems to have
accepted this argument to the point of holding that religious choices
generally may be included in funding programs,50 though it has
shown some reluctance to hold that they must be.51
Second, and related, the welfare state particularly complicates the
effects of aid on church autonomy. The conditions that accompany
government assistance can certainly cause religious organizations to
lose vitality, stray from their distinctive mission, and become
dependent on government. But in the welfare state, the vitality and
mission of religious organizations also face threats if these
organizations are denied assistance while their secular competitors
receive it. Religious organizations must struggle to overcome the
relative disability of being denied significant government benefits.
They may be pressured to become wholly secular in order to receive
aid on a level playing field. Or they may be pressured to alter their
programs and messages in order to attract more private support—not
the level of support that their original messages would attract, but
the extra support necessary to compete against government-favored
secular institutions.52
Thus, on the question of government assistance, the church-state
settlement of the early republic again contained some internal
tensions. And again, subsequent developments may have affected
50. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530
U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 846 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
51. Compare Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (permitting states to single out
ministerial students for exclusion from state education scholarships), with Rasenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (forbidding the exclusion of a student
religious publication from a state university’s general program of subsidizing publications).
52. See Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New Constitutional
Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 195–96 (2003); see also Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and
Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L.
REV. 783, 798 (2002).
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how those ambiguities have been resolved in modern decisions. In
this instance, the development of the welfare state has strengthened
the case for the equal inclusion of religious schools and social services
in funding programs.
C. Religious Autonomy vs. Generally Applicable Laws
The third major church-state dispute today concerns the conflict
between religiously motivated conduct and generally applicable laws
that in a given case restrict such conduct. Courts have pondered the
extent to which religious conduct should be exempt from such laws.
The Supreme Court, in Employment Division v. Smith,53 ruled that
individuals are not entitled to such exemptions under the Free
Exercise Clause in most cases.54 But other decisions suggest that
religious organizations may enjoy some rights to exemption, either
under the Free Exercise Clause or under principles of
nonentanglement and church-state separation founded in the
Establishment Clause.55
Under either rubric, free exercise or nonentanglement, some
right of exemption from the law is important to the autonomy of
religious organizations, as I will detail below.56 And in turn, the
autonomy of religious organizations is a corollary of the voluntary
principle: autonomy allows religious communities to organize
themselves and define their missions according to their own
voluntary choices, without government interference.
Although autonomy is important to religious organizations
either through free exercise or nonentanglement principles, the
Court’s decision in Smith has significantly limited free exercise claims
and thus has posed a threat to the existence of a constitutional right
of autonomy for religious communities. I am quite sympathetic to
the efforts in this conference to preserve such a right in the face of
Smith. These include Professor Kathleen Brady’s argument that the
freedom of communities is essential to the formation of their
53. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
54. Some recent decisions, however, suggest a limited impact for Smith, recognizing
religious exemptions for individuals when the law in question already recognizes exemptions
for comparable secular interests. See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170
F.3d 359, 364–67 (3d Cir. 1999); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1550–53 (D. Neb.
1996).
55. Cf., e.g., NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501–04 (1979).
56. See infra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.
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members’ beliefs, which remain highly protected under Smith,57 and
Professor Perry Dane’s argument that religious organizational
autonomy claims are more bounded and defined than the openended claims to free exercise exemptions rejected in Smith.58 But for
purposes of this Comment on the founding-era voluntary principle
and its implications for today, I want to treat church autonomy
claims as simply a subset of the broader question of whether religious
practices are ever constitutionally exempt from general laws that
apply to them.
Which position on constitutionally mandated religious
exemptions—recognizing them, or rejecting them—is more faithful
to the founding-era settlement and the voluntary principle? This
question has sparked a lively historical debate. Defenders of
mandatory exemptions, such as Justice O’Connor and Professor
Michael McConnell, argue that the founding generation understood
free exercise as a substantive right to engage in religious practices
except where the practice disturbed “public peace” or the rights of
others.59 They point to state constitutional provisions, which almost
unanimously defined the limits of religious freedom in such terms,
and they reason that such definitions would be superfluous if
religious freedom was understood to be limited by any and every law
that was generally applicable and did not single out religion.60 On
the other side, opponents of mandatory exemptions, including
Justice Scalia and Professor Philip Hamburger, argue that the
references to “public peace” encompassed any generally applicable
law.61 Hamburger quotes a number of leading proponents of free
exercise during the founding era who emphasized only that the
government should not purposely involve itself in religious matters
57. Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The Surprising Lessons
of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633.
58. Perry Dane, “Omalous” Autonomy, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1715.
59. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 549–64 (1997) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of
Conscience?: A Critique of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39
WM. & MARY L. REV. 819 (1998) [hereinafter McConnell, Critique]; Michael W. McConnell,
The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1409 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Origins].
60. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 552–55 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); McConnell, Origins, supra
note 59, at 1462–63; McConnell, Critique, supra note 59, at 831–32.
61. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 539 (Scalia, J., concurring); Philip A. Hamburger, A
Constitutional Right of Religious Exemptions: An Historical Analysis, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
915, 915–19 (1992).
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and who conceded the duty to obey the general civil laws.62
Professor Marci Hamilton presents similar evidence in this
conference and elsewhere.63
Although I think that the proexemptions approach reads the
founding era more accurately, the historical materials certainly
provide grist for both interpretations. Let us assume, then, that
exemptions present another issue on which the founding-era
settlement and its principle of voluntarism were ambiguous or
contained internal tensions. Accordingly, in choosing between these
interpretations, we again might wish to consider the effect of
intervening developments. Which view, then, better implements the
voluntary principle in the light of those developments?
One primary development today is the increase of religious
pluralism. The increase in religious pluralism may mean that religious
exemptions are more necessary to preserve the substance of the
voluntary principle. The vast range of newer religions and religious
practices in America will generate many more unanticipated and
unintended impositions on religion from general laws. To prevent
such impositions, courts will have to declare religious exemptions in
particular cases as the need becomes apparent. On the other hand,
religious pluralism also includes a rise in the number of Americans
who explicitly proclaim no religious faith and derive their deep moral
convictions from unabashedly secular sources. This development
makes it more difficult to justify, in a normative sense, a special
concern for the autonomy of religious conscience and religious
communities as against secular counterparts. One possible answer is
to define “religious” conscience very broadly, as the Court did in the
Vietnam-era draft cases.64 Another answer is simply to press forward
and continue to treat religious conscience differently from secular
conscience, as I believe there are good reasons to do under our
Constitution.65
62. HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 937–46.
63. See Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public
Good, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1157 [hereinafter Hamilton, No-Harm Doctrine]; Marci A.
Hamilton, Religion, the Rule of Law, and the Good of the Whole, 18 J.L. & POL. 387 (2002).
64. See, e.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339–44 (1970); United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
65. To put the argument briefly: If the First Amendment gives distinctive protection to
religious practice by private groups, it also places distinctive limits on government espousing or
promoting religious ideas. The common principle is minimizing government involvement in
religious life and religious matters. In striking down government-sponsored prayers and
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Whatever the implications of religious pluralism, the other major
relevant development in modern America—the rise of the welfare
state—points more clearly in favor of religious exemptions,
institutional as well as individual. The rise of modern government
vastly increases the number and scope of laws that can conflict with
the voluntary choices of individuals and communities concerning
religious exercise. Such conflicts will be relatively infrequent when
government is small in scope and limits itself to preventing direct
interference with the bodily or property interests of others. But the
conflicts will multiply when government, as in the welfare state,
prohibits certain actions to prevent diffuse harms throughout society,
or harms that may occur indirectly or in the future rather than
immediately.
As I have already mentioned, opponents of exemptions, such as
Professors Hamburger and Hamilton, point out that many of the
leading clergy proponents of free exercise in the founding era
explicitly supported the rule of law and counseled obedience to the
laws.66 But this argument disregards the possibility that these writers
endorsed laws limited to a certain scope—far more limited than the
overall scope of laws today—and that they did not give carte blanche
to whatever secular law was on the books. For example, when
William Penn defended free exercise rights, he denied that religious
believers sought exemption from laws “that tend to Sober, Just, and
Industrious Living.”67 Other eighteenth-century commentators on
religious liberty likewise spoke of laws that served serious social
interests, arguing for example that magistrates were “obliged to
maintain society and punish all those who destroy the foundations,
as murderers and robbers do.”68 And religious-freedom pioneer
rejecting the argument that this step would treat religious ideas differently from nonreligious
ones, the Court said that “[t]he First Amendment protects . . . religion by quite different
mechanisms” from other ideas; “[t]he design of the Constitution is that preservation and
transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the
private sphere, which itself is promised freedom to pursue that mission.” Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 589, 591 (1992). For fuller presentations of such arguments, see, for example,
Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious Freedom Legislation, and Why They Are Wrong,
21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 440–41 (1999); Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling
Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2000).
66. HAMBURGER, supra note 44, at 937–46; Hamilton, No-Harm Doctrine, supra note
63, at 1156.
67. William Penn, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience, in 1 A COLLECTION OF THE
WORKS OF WILLIAM PENN 457 (photo. reprint 1974) (1726).
68. Pierre Bayle, Philosophical Commentary on These Words of Christ: Compel Them To
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Roger Williams, in the words of a leading modern scholar,
emphasized that “civil government was limited to its responsibility
for preserving peace and civility”; therefore, Williams did not accept
“subjecting the claims of conscience to any generally applicable law
so long as it does not deliberately infringe upon religious belief or
act. Rather, . . . Williams saw conscience subjected to particular laws,
and he viewed these laws as within the specific scope of the
government’s ordained responsibilities.”69
Similarly, Thomas Jefferson, who made statements suggesting
that religious-freedom rights would never overcome general civic
duties,70 also proceeded from the premise that civic duties were
limited to avoiding identifiable injury to others.71 Professor
Hamburger likewise observes that founding-era proponents of free
exercise did not emphasize a general right of exemption in significant
part because, at that time, “the jurisdiction of civil government and
the
authority
of
religion
were
frequently
considered
distinguishable”72—a premise that would no longer hold true once
government’s jurisdiction greatly expanded in the twentieth century.
Consider just one example of expanded government that has
major implications for the autonomy of religious communities. We
now have numerous laws regulating private entities’ relations with
their employees. Many such laws likely qualify as neutral and
generally applicable under Employment Division v. Smith. But the
founding generation would not have contemplated most of these
laws, nor considered regulation of internal employment practices to
be necessary to preserve “public peace.” Can one really argue that
the concept of public peace, as the founding generation understood
Come In, in PIERRE BAYLE’S PHILOSOPHICAL COMMENTARY: A MODERN TRANSLATION AND
CRITICAL INTERPRETATION 7, 167 (Amie Goodman Tannenbaum trans., 1987).
69. Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious Liberty, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 455, 486 (1991). These and analogous quotes are collected in McConnell, Critique,
supra note 59, at 825–26.
70. Jefferson stated that a citizen has “no natural right in opposition to his social
duties.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S.
Nelson: A Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in THE REPUBLIC
OF REASON: THE PERSONAL PHILOSOPHIES OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 135 (Norman
Cousins ed., 1988) [hereinafter REPUBLIC OF REASON].
71. “The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to
others.” Thomas Jefferson, Republican Notes on Religion and an Act Establishing Religious
Freedom, Passed in the Assembly of Virginia, in the Year 1786, reprinted in REPUBLIC OF
REASON, supra note 70, at 123.
72. Hamburger, supra note 61, at 936–37.
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it, would encompass requiring employers to pay for controversial
medical procedures for their employees?73 Likewise, the founding
generation would not have contemplated the employmentdiscrimination laws, let alone that those laws would apply facially to
the hiring and firing of ministers.
I certainly am not questioning the justice or wisdom of these
statutes in their general application. But just as certainly, such
statutes expand government’s scope beyond what the founding-era
leaders envisioned when they said that religious freedom must give
way to laws preserving public peace. The welfare-state expansion of
government’s sphere will dramatically shrink the scope of religious
autonomy from that of the founding era, unless there is some sort of
doctrine exempting religious activity from some laws. Some principle
of exemptions, whether under the Free Exercise or the
Establishment clause, is necessary to preserve the terms of the
church-state settlement under today’s circumstances.
For these reasons, it is beside the point to argue against a
doctrine of autonomy, as Professor Hamilton does in this
conference, on the ground that it will immunize churches from
liability for direct batteries against unconsenting third parties—that
is, for sexual abuse of children.74 These and other direct batteries
have always been the paradigm case of conduct falling outside the
free exercise of religion.75 Those who espouse the antiexemptions
position must deal with the tougher cases—the plethora of modern
laws that rely on the possibility of diffuse or distant harms to restrict
behavior today.
If institutional autonomy is to be preserved, we also must deal
with some misunderstandings and misplaced priorities concerning
the concepts of autonomy and nonentanglement. First, we need to
recognize that facially neutral, generally applicable laws sometimes
can promote religious autonomy but at other times intrude on it. In
Jones v. Wolf,76 the Court approved the application of “neutral
principles of law” for disputes over church property. Jones’ approval
73. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004)
(rejecting an exemption from a law requiring coverage of contraceptives).
74. See Hamilton, No-Harm Doctrine, supra note 63, at 1210.
75. For documentation of a standard focusing on direct invasions of others’ interests,
see, for example, Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1145 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Revisionism].
76. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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of “neutral principles” might be seen as precedent for the Smith
ruling that a neutral, generally applicable law satisfies the Free
Exercise Clause no matter how serious a restriction it imposes on
religious practice. But as Professor Dane points out in his
contribution, Jones reflected quite a different premise.77 The Court
there reasoned that the general laws of property and trusts are
designed to “order[ ] private rights and obligations to reflect the
intentions of the parties”; therefore, by including appropriate legal
provisions, “a religious organization can ensure that a dispute over
the ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the
desires of the members,” and “civil courts will be bound to give
effect to the result indicated by the parties.”78 Jones recognized that
many neutral laws can facilitate a religious community’s selfdefinition precisely because their neutrality allows them to serve as
vessels for a wide variety of organizational choices. But that
argument only extends to laws that facilitate organizations’ choices.
It provides no support for laws like the peyote prohibition in Smith
or the employment discrimination laws as applied to church
employees, which override choices and thus intrude on the
autonomy of religious life.79 Such laws should not get a
constitutional pass just because they are facially neutral; they ought
to be justified as enforcing legitimate boundaries on the scope of
religious freedom.
A second complication arises from a misplaced priority between
two aspects of church autonomy—or, put differently, two aspects of
government nonentanglement in religion. One aspect concerns
whether religious organizations are actually free to organize
themselves, define their mission, and choose their workers without
undue government interference—this might be called “substantive
nonentanglement.” Another aspect concerns whether judges or
other government officials rest their decision making on theological
judgments that are (it is asserted) beyond their authority or
competence—principles forbidding such judgments might be called

77. Dane, supra note 58, at 1736.
78. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603–04, 606.
79. For fuller articulations of this distinction, see Thomas C. Berg, The Federal
Constitution, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, A STUDY OF IDENTITY,
LIBERTY AND THE LAW (James A. Serritella et al. eds., forthcoming 2005); Dane, supra note
58; Ira Mark Ellmann, Driven from the Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church
Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1378, 1406–07, 1422–23 (1981).
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“decisional nonentanglement.” Both of these principles of
nonentanglement help secure religious autonomy from state
interference. But today, decisional nonentanglement seems to be the
dominant focus, rather than just one component, of religious
autonomy. Jones, for example, allows courts to apply neutral
principles of law to a church property dispute, except when doing so
would require the court to “conside[r] doctrinal matters, whether
the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of the faith.”80 And
one of the most common rationales for exempting churches’
decisions concerning ministers from the antidiscrimination laws is
that such lawsuits would require courts to decide religious questions
concerning the minister’s competence or suitability.81
I suggest that decisional nonentanglement, though often
important, is less central to religious autonomy than is substantive
nonentanglement. More important than whether courts avoid
theological questions is whether religious organizations are
substantively free to organize themselves and define their mission
free from unwarranted governmental interference. The ministerial
exemption should rest fundamentally on the right of a church to
choose its leaders and those who speak for it; to say that it rests on
saving the courts from confronting theological questions is to
misplace priorities. We keep courts out of such questions not just for
the sake of doing so, but ultimately for the sake of substantive
religious autonomy: when judges make theological determinations,
they may distort and unjustifiably override a church’s organization
and self-understanding.
In fact, the emphasis on decisional nonentanglement may
actually detract from substantive religious autonomy. Smith, for
example, rejected the constitutional-exemptions approach in
significant part because it would require courts to consider how
central a practice was to a faith—before balancing it against the
state’s interests—and such an inquiry “is akin to the unacceptable
80. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Md. & Va.
Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
81. See, e.g., Bollard v. Cal. Province of Soc’y of Jesus, 211 F.3d 1331, 1332–33 (9th
Cir. 2000) (Wardlaw, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); see also EEOC v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795, 800 n.*, 804–05 (4th Cir. 2000); Gellington v.
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1302–04 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs v.
Cent. Tex. Annual Conf. of United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 347–50 (5th Cir.
1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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‘business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious
claims.’”82 The idea of decisional nonentanglement—the fear that
saying anything remotely theological would intrude on religious
autonomy—led the Court to cut back dramatically on the
substantive autonomy of religious organizations under the Free
Exercise Clause.
Of course, accepting in principle a doctrine of exemptions for
church autonomy only begins the inquiry. There are serious
questions as to how far any such exemptions should extend, and
what social interests should limit them. Under any defensible
approach, lines will need to be drawn. No serious commentator
asserts that constitutional autonomy authorizes church leaders
following church doctrines to inflict physical harm on others, even if
the harm-producing conduct is central to the doctrines. Judges or
legislators attempting to apply constitutional principles will have to
distinguish clear or direct harms to others (such as sexual assaults on
adults or children) from speculative and indirect harms (such as,
perhaps, those following from peyote use). Or the proper distinction
may be between matters truly “internal” to the church (perhaps the
employment of clergy) and those better characterized as “external”
(for example, the treatment of children attending a church-operated
school). Even harms to others, of course, are not automatically
attributable to the church entity, if the wrongdoer is acting outside
the scope of his employment. And where the church entity is
properly liable, autonomy may still impose limits on the size or scope
of the remedy.83
The fact that constitutional autonomy has limits does not mean
it is nonexistent. In her contribution to this conference, Professor
Hamilton concedes that some religious practices that violate general
statutes on the books are nevertheless consistent with the public
good and ought to be exempted by the legislature.84 But she asserts
that courts are unable to draw such lines in constitutional litigation.85
82. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
83. For varying views on these issues in the context of sexual abuse cases, see, for
example, Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical Immunity,
2004 BYU L. REV. 1789; John H. Mansfield, Constitutional Limits on the Liability of Churches
for Negligent Supervision and Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1167 (2002). I take
no position here on the scope of church autonomy in such cases.
84. Hamilton, No-Harm Doctrine, supra note 63, at 1174.
85. Id. at 1198.
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This concession switches the debate from substantive to institutional
questions. It switches the debate from the meaning of religious
freedom—does it point to exemptions in some legal form?—to the
boundaries of justiciability and judicial competence. I think that
coherent and judicially manageable lines do exist so that we are not
forced to accept each and every generally applicable law no matter
how severe its impact on religious autonomy.86 But the location of
those lines is a matter for other articles and future conferences.

86. For efforts to develop principles distinguishing protected from unprotected religious
conduct, see, for example, the articles in Symposium: Restoring Religious Freedom in the States,
32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. (Spring 1999); Berg, supra note 65, at 429–32; Douglas Laycock,
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the
Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1402–13 (1981); McConnell,
Revisionism, supra note 75, at 1145–49; Stephen Pepper, Taking the Free Exercise Clause
Seriously, 1986 BYU L. REV. 299.
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